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Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
This Article focuses on the constitutional rights of persons with severe
disabilities, arguing that the most severely disabledpersons should not always be
treated the same way as less severely disabled persons-just as severely and slightly
injured tort plaintiffs should not receive equal damage awards. Professor Wright
argues that federal constitutional and statutory law does not provide equal
protection to persons with severe disabilities. A disabled person does not receive
equal protection of the laws by receipt ofjust any government payment; the
government payment must correspond to the circumstances the disabled person is
in and the depth of his or her basic need or deprivation. Professor Wright
concludes that, when establishing these government payment amounts,
standardized but reasonably sensitive categories should be developed, thereby
establishing a balance between a purely individualized standard and a crude
distinction between severe and non-severe disabilities.
"Perhaps because everyone can imagine having been switched in the cradle, it is
easy to think, about the members of a deprived class, 'There but for the grace of
God go I 'But one's natural talents are not so easily switched, and that hinders the
moral imagination."
-Thomas Nagel**
I. INTRODUCTION
Our attitudes toward persons with disabilities are complex.1 Insofar as public
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The author wishes to thank,
and simultaneously absolve ofresponsibility, Tony Alfieri, Peter Blanck, Ruth Colker, Deborah
Denno, John Garvey, Andy Klein, Robert Ladenson, David Lyons, George Martinez, Steven
Smith, and Mark Weber, for their comments and encouragement on this and related articles.
** THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALrIY AND PARTIALIY 113 (1991). See also Anita Silvers,
"Defective" Agents: Equality, Difference and the Tyranny of the Normal, 25 J. Soc. PHIL. 154,
158 (1994) ("[W]e cannot seem to operationalize impartial moral judgment when it comes to
imagining ourselves in a disabled person's place.").
I See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1003, 1003
(1998). For a concise literary example, consider the following sample of some reactions to the four
year old Quasimodo:
"What is the world coming to," said Jehanne, "if that's the way they make children
nowadays?"
"I don't know much about children," resumed Agnes, "but it must be a sin to look at this
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attitudes are embodied in federal constitutional and statutory law, our general
sentiment is one of limited benevolence. Limited benevolence toward persons with
disabilities is a response with which, in contemporary parlance, we are comfortable.
The argument below, however, is that our comfort does not set the bounds to what
may be required of us as a matter of constitutional equal protection. The current
overall package of government programs and benefits, we shall argue, denies
severely disabled persons the equal protection of the laws, even if we do not think
of such persons as a classic discrete and insular minority. To receive some special
government payment is not necessarily to receive the equal protection of the laws,
even if other groups receive no corresponding payment at all. This depends, as we
shall see, on the circumstances in which the parties blamelessly find themselves, and
the depth of their basic need or deprivation.
We will focus in particular on persons with the most severe disabilities. Plainly,
not all disabilities are equal in their effects, and not all disabilities are treated equally
by the public. For our purposes, the more severe disabilities, generally, are those
that most adversely affect typical basic life activities, from birth or at least from an
early age, and that are likely permanent in their effects. These effects certainly need
not be thought of as purely medical or physiological; they may well better be
thought of as a matter of how society responds, fails to respond, or places obstacles
in the path of such persons. Many persons who are considered disabled would not
be so considered if our physical and social institutions were otherwise structured.
Disability is largely a matter of what is not statistically common, and therefore not
catered to.
While the severity of a disability is thus partly a matter of impairment of
functioning and crucially of public response, we should also bear in mind the burden
of uninsurable financial costs that may be involved. Some disabilities involve
expensive medical Ireatment therapy, or other accommodation, but other
one."
"It's not a child at all, Agnes. It's a deformed ape," observed Gauch~re.
"It's a miracle," said Henrietta ]a Gaulti~re.
VICrOR HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME 140 (Walter J. Cobb & Phyllis La Farge trans.,
Penguin Signet ed. 1965). For an even more concise example of societal ambivalence toward
persons with disabilities, consider the following incident that occurred two months after the
effective date of the public accommodations section of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
"[I]oumalist John Hockenberry... had paid $60 for his ticket and had checked in advance that
the theater was accessible. But when he showed up, the theater manager refused to help seat him.
'You are a fire hazard, sir,' the manager complained." JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PrrY: PEOPLE WrH
DIsABILmEs FORGING ANEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 333 (1994). Actually, it is difficult to
imagine a more concise example ofthe combination of superficial politeness and objectification.
Of course, these attitudes do not begin to exhaust the range of public attitudes toward the disabled,
as we shall see further below in connection with our discussion of Carolene Products prejudice,
infra Part III.
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disabilities do not. In any event, there is surely a rough consensus on which forms
of disability are more and less severe. For some purposes, what people think of as
a severe disability and what "really" is a severe disability may be taken to be the
same.
Beyond this, we will not further define the precise bounds of the category of
severe disability. It is more important to establish some basic constitutional
arguments, leaving the details to the workings of the political and judicial processes.
Certainly, there will not be much difference between those who count as just barely
severely disabled and those who are just barely not severely disabled. Those in the
latter category will still receive some sorts of standard benefits under federal and
state statutes. This kind of boundary line problem exists whenever we more
traditionally distinguish between those who count as disabled for some purpose and
those who do not. Ordinarily, we do not refuse to establish benefit programs for
persons with disabilities on the grounds that it would be hard to decide marginal
classification cases. Focusing on the most severe disabilities is important. The most
severely disabled persons should not always be constitutionally treated in exactly
the same way as the least severely disabled, any more than severely and slightly
injured tort plaintiffs should receive equal damages awards, or than every person
whose property is taken by the state should receive an equal condemnation award.
For some political purposes, it is reasonable to adopt a broad, inclusive definition
of disability, and to assume that all disabled persons should be treated alike. It is
easier to persuade legislators to make public venues more broadly accessible if such
a rule is promoted by a large and broad coalition. Breadth and inclusiveness may
thus enhance overall political influence through sheer numbers and coalition
building. But it is also important to recognize the costs of a broad approach to
disability. The greater the number of persons who are to be eligible for a given
benefit, the more expensive it will be to fund the benefit in question. As government
programs with standard, uniform benefit levels expand, it will be decreasingly likely
that the benefit levels will fairly address the circumstances of the most severely
disabled persons.2 If, for example, the same benefits are to be accorded to all
disabled persons, it is more likely that the worst off will be undercompensated than
that all other disabled persons will be overcompensatedV
This is not to suggest that persons with less severe disabilities deserve only
minimal benefits, or that any particular government program is currently adequate
even for their purposes. Instead, the point is that persons with the most severe
disabilities should not be treated as though their disabilities were only slight or
moderate in severity. Such treatment can rise to the level of a constitutional equal
2 See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role ofDisability in the Social Welfare
System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 364 (1996) (arguing that broad definitions of disability tend to
drive benefit levels down toward general poverty relief program levels).
3 See id.
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protection violation. The fact that some sort of special benefit is being paid does not
necessarily establish that the equal protection of the laws is being respected. We
shall argue that persons with severe disabilities are denied the equal protection of
the law, ironically, even if they receive some benefits not received by non-disabled
persons.
It is entirely possible that most non-disabled persons simply do not care to
recognize any expensive equal protection rights running in favor of the most
severely disabled persons. This might be for worthy reasons, or for reasons based
in self-indulgence and a culture of consumption. This rights extension would
involve some further transfer of resources from those without disabilities, or from
the well off generally, to those with severe disabilities. This disinclination to pay
may well be reflected by the accepted constitutional law and the judicial system
itself. But the mere disinclination to recognize a right does not undermine the logic
of that right. It is logically possible for the public and the judicial system to unjustly
refuse to recognize a right. There is a logic of constitutional equal protection that
remains even if we do not care to admit all the implications of that logic. By way
of analogy, there would be a sense in which a racial minority's equal protection
rights would be violated by, let us say, the preventive detention of all members of
that minority, even if most voters and most judges declared otherwiseA We should
nether deny the reality nor the injustice of arbitrary treatment. If the equal protection
rights of the most severely disabled persons are ever to be fully recognized, we must
start by thinking about the contours of those rights. Recognizing the scope of those
rights in the realm of argument is only a first step, but surely a necessary step, in
eventually recognizing the scope of such rights in practice.
It is also possible-indeed, it is certain-that some of the most severely
disabled persons themselves would not seek, or believe themselves to deserve, equal
protection rights entitling them to more substantial resource transfers.5 They may
deny more broadly the meaningfulness or validity of the category of severe
disability, at least as it is typically used. Some such persons ask only that the public
recognize their real capacities and not place barriers in their path. Some deny that
it would be better to be what the broader society considers non-disabled, and say
that if there were some magical "cure" for their disability, they would refuse to take
it.6
4 Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (involving the imprisonment of
Japanese-Americans during World WarIl forno other reason than their ancestry).
5 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACnCAL ETHICS 51-54 (2d ed. 1993).
6 See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The LegalEmpowerment of
Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORYL.J. 245,264 (1994) (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra note 1).
For a cogent exposition of the non-inferiority of disabled persons, see, for example., Anita Silvers,
"Defective" Agents: Equality, Difference, and the Tyranny of the Normal, 25 J. SOC. PHIL. 154,
156, 158 (1994).
[Vol. 60:145
DISABILITIES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
We are certainly not in any position to second guess such judgments. Disability
should obviously not be considered a source of shame, indignity, embarrassment,
or as a mark of inferiority. We can imagine cultures that accommodate what we
would think of as disability without much ceremony, or that treat what we would
think of as disability as a sign of divine favor, if not of divinity itself. We can
imagine cultures that associate blindness with wisdom, and that highly regard
wisdom. A severe disability may be thought of as involving a unique or different
life path, and certainly one that is valuable and well worth taking. Non-disabled
persons may well not appreciate what it is like to be severely disabled, and may in
some cases grossly underestimate the value and satisfaction of a life involving
severe disability. But it is fair to note that a severely disabled person who prefers
disability already has an established identity as a disabled person, even if this
identity is a purely social construct just as non-disabled persons have established
identities in which disability and non-disability is often less salient 7 To say that one
would take an entirely hypothetical but actually non-existent magical "cure' is thus
in a sense to turn one's back on one's own identity, for very little real payoff.
There is no available standpoint that is rigorously neutral as between disability
and non-disability. We cannot easily abstract away from our disability or lack
thereof. This would require enormous imaginative power. We can, however, at least
say that there is some evidence that most disabled persons do not seem to take the
view that such a cure would not be worth taking.8 To pursue the matter, we can at
least do thought experiments about disabilities and fair compensation. And we can
try in particular to pry away the effects of our established identities by thinking
hypothetically about children.
Consider, for example, the case of a physiologically normal, very young child
who has, for the sake of simplicity, no relatives with any interest in the matter. The
child has, we assume, not much of a conscious self-image, has not yet
psychologically "invested" or "planned" significantly, and has not yet grasped any
distinction between disability and non-disability. The child thus has not yet
developed a relevant identity. Let us then assume, however gruesomely, that the
child is anesthetized and has her spine deliberately and pointlessly crushed by a
bystander, pemanently denying her any use of her arms or legs. We must then ask
only whether we would consider that act of the bystander to be neither immoral nor
tortious, beyond the technical non-consensual touching and any unpaid medical
bills. Has the child merely been taken down one path at a fork in life's road? Has
she merely had some choices precluded, and some other choices opened up? Would
a figure of about six hundred dollars a month strike us as full and proper
7 For a racial analogue, see, for example, Thomas Ross, Being White, 46 BuFF. L. REv. 257,
257 (1998) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY L6Pz, WHrrE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCrION OF
RACE (1996)).
8 See supra notes 5-6.
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compensation? We shall, for purposes of this article, instead assume that the child
has been significantly morally wronged and legally injured, beyond being deprived
of the choice as to whether she later wishes to disable herself or not.
This certainly does not suggest that any disabled person should be considered
"inferior" as a person. It is quite the contrary. If disabled persons were inferior, they
would on standard analyses deserve inferior treatment. However ironical as it may
seem, a claim to equal protection presupposes that one is in a crucial sense already
equal to one's fellow persons. We instead argue for, at a minimum, the moral
equality of disabled persons. It is on the basis of this equality that disabled persons
deserve the genuinely equal protection of the laws. Of course, a person with severe
disabilities should be entitled to freely refuse the alleged benefits of a redistributive
transfer program of the sort discussed below.
We shall assume specifically that once the government chooses to somehow
address persons with severe disabilities, whether benevolently or unthinkingly, it
must do so in a manner fully consistent with the underlying logic of the equal
protection clause.9 Our basic technique will be to first briefly illustrate the nature
of federal statutory programs addressing persons with disabilities in general.10 Then,
at somewhat greater length, we will explore the currently established constitutional
law doctrine and then the deeper underlying logic of equal protection in this
context.11 We will conclude that while the disabled, and even the most severely
disabled, do not qualify for suspect classification status, current federal programs
nonetheless fall short of the requirements of equal protection for persons with severe
disabilities.
This is not to suggest; given the current public mood, that there is much realistic
likelihood that persons with severe disabilities are soon to receive the genuinely
equal protection of the laws as outlined below. Sheer self-interest of the majority
probably precludes this. But this is not the point. It is important to document the
constitutional treatment that the most severely disabled persons logically deserve,
and to compare that level of treatment with that actually accorded. This, at the very
least undercuts the hypocrisy and complacency with which we commonly celebrate
our commitment to equal protection. It exposes the gap between our collective self-
image and our collective self-indulgence. There is perhaps even a certain dignity in
9 Some of the considerations relied upon below, such as those of freedom and autonomy,
may well not apply, at least in the same way, to the most severely cognitively or otherwise
mentally disabled persons. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation,
1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 396. Other considerations, such as the financial cost of medical and
other sorts of care, may apply in such cases. To the extent that persons with severe cognitive
disabilities do not fall within the logic and scope of the arguments below, the equal protection
rights of such persons may be correspondingly affected.
10 See infra Part If.
1 See infra Parts Il-IV.
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admitting that we pretend to constitutional standards we do not genuinely endeavor
to uphold. This Article can, at the very least, contribute to a more realistic, if less
collectively flattering, understanding of our constitutional law.
We commonly think in particular, of our constitutional system as being based
on the consent of the governed, but it is absurd to claim that we have collectively
decided, on a carefully considered basis, that severely disabled persons would freely
and voluntarily consent to a regime affording them only our current minimalist
constitutional protections. There is no reason to believe that a discussion between
persons with and without severe disabilities would, on the basis of genuinely free
and voluntary agreement, result in the general endorsement of our current equal
protection system of only limited benevolence toward persons with undeserved
severe disabilities.
I. FEDERAL STATUTORY RESPONSES TO DisABimTy
A number of federal statutes directly address the rights and opportunities of
persons with disabilities. 12 We can refer, briefly, to some of the most significant.
These few are certainly significant enough in themselves, and generally illustrative
of the rest Consider first the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, formerly
known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.13 The Supreme Court
has authoritatively declared that this statute "imposes no clear obligation upon
recipient States beyond the requirement that handicapped children receive some
form of specialized education .... 14 The Court has further declared in particular
that the Act does not reflect any "congressional intent to achieve strict equality of
opportunity or services,"15 or to maximize each student's potential commensurate
with the opportunities afforded other children.16 As thus interpreted, the statute falls
within what we have referred to as the category of limited governmental
benevolence. Virtually by its own admission, the statute does not even attempt to
ensure equal opportunity, or the genuinely equal protection of the laws.
12 See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (formerly known as the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1988 & Supp. 1997);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994 & Supp 1996); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); Supplemental Security Income
program embodied in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1994 & Supp. 1996); see
also Diller, supra note 1, at 1005.
13 See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (1988 & Supp. 1997); Cleveland Heights-University
Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391,396 (6th Cir. 1998).
14 Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 195 (1982).
15 Id. at 198.
16 See id.
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The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),17 which is typically interpreted
in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,18 is certainly an enactment of
great breadth and significance. But in the important context of employment, for
example, the ADA does not require anything remotely like affirmative action or
government subsidies,19 and requires only "reasonable" accommodation of persons
with disabilities, subject to an "undue hardship" constraint.20 An undue hardship
under the ADA involves merely any "significant difficulty or expense." 21 In the
absence of any relevant government subsidy, this limitation on the costs statutorily
imposed upon private employers who may be vulnerable to market competitors is
hardly surprising. But this limitation built into the ADA practically ensures that
those among the most severely disabled persons who do aspire to employment will
receive only minimal benefit from the employment provisions of the ADA.
It seems almost inevitable that within the broad category of persons with
disabilities, the employment provisions of the ADA will generally provide help in
a degree inversely correlated with the applicant's severity of disability. Surely, one
would imagine, the least disabled will typically gain the most, and the most disabled
the least.22 Severely disabled candidates must still prove that they are the best
qualified for the job, with no more than rather minimally expensive
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
18 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994 & Supp. 1996). For the general correspondence in
interpretation, see, for example, Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F3d 803, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1997); Wooten
v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382,385 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995). In turn, the federal statutes may guide
or limit the interpretation of state statutes. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F3d
12, 14 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[1]nterpretation of the ADA and of the Maine Human Rights Act have
proceeded hand in hand.").
19 See Bonnie O'Day, Economics Versus CivilRights, 3 CORNEL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 294-
300(1994).
20 See, e.g., Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284-86 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam);
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing the
cost-benefit analysis to be performed at the stage of both the reasonableness ofthe accommodation
and at the stage of alleged undue hardship); Borkowski v. Valley Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131,
136-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (analyzing the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship"
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). It should also be borne in mind that the ADA does not
require the hiring of qualified disabled applicants over equally qualified non-disabled applicants.
See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 376 (1997). Contrast as
well the idea of a federal civil rights statute permitting the exclusion or non-hiring of racial
minorities or women if admitting orhiring such persons would pose an "undue hardship" to the
employer. See David Wasserman, Impairment, Disadvantage, and Equality: A Reply to Anita
Silvers, 25 . Soc. PHIL. 181, 186 (1994).
21 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543 (quoting the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (1994)).
22 See O'Day, supra note 19, at 294; David Wasserman, Disability, Discrimination, and
Fairness, 13 PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y7, 11 (1993).
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accommodation. Of course, this general tendency would hardly be exceptionless.
One can envision, for example, a situation in which a relatively severely disabled
paraplegic canlbe accommodated at a lower overall cost than, say, a less severely
disabled person who must for a time take unpredictable job absences. 23 But this
pattern would not be the most common. The ADA may well help disabled job
seekers in general, but it quite likely will perversely and regressively expand the
inequalities of opportunity between the least disabled and most severely disabled.
Even if it were plausible that the most severely disabled job applicants
benefited from the ADA as much as less severely disabled job applicants, we would
still need to place this in perspective. It is clear that even after the enactment of the
ADA, most substantially disabled adults do not work in, or actively seek
employment in, competitive market employment 24 and thus cannot possibly benefit
from the modest employment provisions of the ADA. A statute that leaves severely
disabled persons as still perceived as practically "unemployable," if perhaps
somewhat less so than before the enactment of the statute, hardly ensures the equal
protection of the laws.
The ADA's employment provisions can thus be seen as falling within the
category of merely limited benevolence. Can the same thing be said, though, about
explicit resource transfer programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
available to qualified persons with disabilities?25 The SSI program is intended to
assist otherwise qualified persons "who have attained age 65 or are blind or
disabled."26 Approximately 100,000 of the claims adjudicated annually are in
particular for children with disabilities.27
The scope of coverage of SSI may be broad, but its substantive ambitions are
23 It is also likely that some persons whose disabilities are relatively mild or intermittent and
not easily detected by employers may choose to conceal their condition, thus not asking for any
accommodation under the ADA.
24 See Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79 IOWA L. REV. 853, 913
(1994) ("[C]urrent estimates of unemployment levels for persons with disabilities range from fifty
to ninety percent."). Also revealing is that "[o]f the approximately 14,000 Title I claims filed in
1993, roughly thirty-one percent involved a back and spine related disability, with less than one
percent of all claims involving mental retardation." Id. at 921.
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
26 Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 524 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1381). The test for
disability for these purposes tracks the standard Social Security disability insurance program
requirements. See id
27 See id.; see also Elizabeth J. Jameson & Stephen C. King, The Failure of the Federal
Government to Care for Disabled Children: A Critical Analysis of the Supplemental Security
Income Program, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309,316 (1989) (stating that there are 290,256
disabled poor children in the SSI program as of 1988).
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otherwise starkly limited. The focus is on providing a "guaranteed"28 income to
those who qualify, but the level that is to be guaranteed is characterized as only of
minimal decency29 or minimal subsistence.3° In order to qualify, claimants must not
exceed certain maximum income and resource limitations, with the modest
maximum benefits being reduced if other sources of income and resources are
available.3 1
The maximum available benefits may doubtless be vital or indispensable to
their recipients, but this does not mean that the benefits are properly characterized
as anything other than "small."'32 After all, to protect someone's most elemental
interests is not necessarily to provide that person with the equal protection of the
laws. The maximum SSI benefits, apart from any reductions, would by itself 33
typically fall short even of realistic subsistence levels. The maximum SSI benefit
level, for a single individual with no countable income, whether moderately or
severely disabled, was recently set at $484 per month.34 This figure has modestly
risen over time from somewhat lower levels.35 The reader is invited to compare the
2 8 Zebley, 493 U.S. at 524.
2 9 See Doyle v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 740,744 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jones v. Shalala, 5 F.3d
447,450 (9th Cir. 1993)).
3 0 See Doyle, 62 F.3d at 744 (quoting Jones, 5 F.3d at 451-52).
31 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Work Disability and the Fabric ofMental Health Law: An
Introduction, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND ThE LAW 1, 2 (Richard J. Bonnie &
John Monahan eds., 1997) (explaining that the SSI program is means-tested, as opposed to the
insurance-oriented higher disability benefits for covered workers which is not means-tested); Ellis
v. Apfel, 147 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Gordon v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 101, 101 (2d Cir.
1995)); Doyle, 62 F.3d at 742. The income limitations are complex. See, eg.,Ellis, 147 F3d at 141
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1997)); Doyle, 62 F.3d at 742 n.1. The maximum resource limits
are also quite stringent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)-(h) (1994 & Supp. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 4162020-
416.2099 (1998).
32 Jameson & King, supra note 27, at 314.
33 The SSI cash benefit by itself may be misleading, as eligibility under the SSI program may
trigger eligibility for other, perhaps more valuable benefits. See Vaughn v. Sullivan, 83 F.3d 907,
909 (7th Cir. 1996). SSI eligibility may thus trigger Medicaid eligibility, and Medicaid eligibility
may certainly cost the provider more than the SSI benefit. See id. at 909.
34 See 1997 Social Security Handbook § 2171 (13th ed. 1997) (available at
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/ssa-hbkhtm).
35 See, e.g., Simmons v. Chater, 104 F.3d 168, 169 (8th Cir. 1997) ("As of the date of
Simmons' hearing, the statutory income limit for an SSI recipient was $466 per month."); Andrea
Hyatt, Legislation Allowing DisabledBeneficiaries to Collect SSI ProvidingDisabledAmericans
the American Dream of Comfort, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 5 (1996) (stating the maximum benefit
level at $458 per month); Stokely v. Apfel, 56 Soc. Sec. Rep. Ser. 673 ln.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(stating that the benefits under SSI are $556 per month; Johnson v. Wing, 12 F. Supp. 2d 311, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that claimant received $494 federal SSI grant, plus $86 state
supplementation, and $42 in food stamps, all on a monthly basis).
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$484 figure with a reasonable minimal budget for rent, utilities, food, clothing,
necessary services, and transportation, under the typical circumstances of the most
severely disabled persons.
The reader is then further invited to consider a free and voluntary choice
between a life, from birth or an early age, of severe disability but with current
federal programs and benefit levels, and, in the alternative, a life with no such
disability and no associated such program benefits. Can most of us say, with any
sincerity, that we would be indifferent as between these two possibilities, given the
governmental benefits that offset the various financial and stigmatic costs and
injuries imposed on the severely disabled? Any suggestion that the governmental
transfer programs are much more than tokenistic, as opposed to genuinely and
deeply equal protection-oriented, is simply implausible, as we shall see in Parts III
and IV below.
IR. DiSABmrrY AND DISCRETE AND INSULAR MInoRrTIS
Under the current constitutional case law, the income and resource limits and
the benefit levels under SSI are generally protected from serious equal protection
scrutiny. As one court has observed, "[tihe classifications used.., in determining
the level of SSI benefits to which an SSI recipient is entitled are subject to rational
basis review.' 36 This minimum judicial scrutiny requires merely that the relevant
statute and regulations 'have a rational basis and do not engage in invidious
discrimination .... ,37 It is typically concluded that the relevant SSI law does not
raise serious issues of fundamental rights or invidious discrimination.38 Thus, equal
protection of disabled persons, under the current case law, does not require equality,
or much protection, at all.
The idea here may be that because some, though hardly all, disabled persons,
including some severely disabled persons, receive SSI benefits not available to non-
disabled persons, who do not otherwise qualify, then disabled persons, or perhaps
the least severely disabled persons who meet the program's income requirements,
have no grounds for a complaint based on equal protection grounds. One might,
certainly, have received nothing at all. Something is better than nothing. Perhaps
one should merely be grateful. Our view, however, is different A government does
not provide the equal protection of the laws by offering quite limited, inadequate
help in rescuing swimmers who are blamelessly drowning, while offering no rescue
services to swimmers who are not drowning. This is inequality in terms of basic
36 Ellis, 147 F.3d at 144 (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976); Brown v.
Bowen, 905 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1990)).
37 Id. (quoting Brown, 905 F.2d at 635); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,486
(1970).
38 See, e.g., Ellis, 147 F.3d at 145.
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protection and basic need fulfillment.
Under the standard constitutional framework, persons with disabilities could
powerfully challenge the substantive provisions of the SSI and other statutes
referred to above only by showing that disability, or some forms and degrees of
disability, amount to a suspect classification. The law of suspect classifications is
of course traced historically to dicta in the Carolene Products case.39 Carolene
Products, as developed and limited by further case law, raised the possibility of
"more exacting scrutiny,"40 under the Equal Protection Clause, of "statutes directed
at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities .... -41
This passage has been variously interpreted. On one typical view, "[a] suspect
class is a group of individuals whom the Court recognizes as deserving special
protection from our majoritarian, political process because the group has a history
of having been subjected to purposeful, unjustified discrimination, and a history of
political powerlessness."42 A bit more elaborately:
[L]egislative enactments were subject to more exacting scrutiny if they
discriminated against a readily identifiable group that had suffered a history of
invidious discrimination and was powerless, disenfranchised, or substantially
disadvantaged in the political arena. Some of the cases also spoke of the
immutability of the group's distinguishing trait, the "innocence" of individuals who
had not voluntarily selected group membership, and... the discreteness and
insularity of the group in society.43
It is certainly possible to criticize all or any element of the broad Carolene
Products approach to suspect status. 44 Many minorities are not absolutely shut out
39 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
40 Id.
4 1 Id. (citations omitted). For discussion of the drafling and presumed intent of this well-
known footnote, see Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
42 Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating,
Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937,938 (1991).
43 james W. Ellis, On the "Usefulness" ofSuspect Classflcations, 3 CoNsT. CoMMENTARY
375, 376 (1986). For further discussion, see Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A
Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMIL. REV. 107, 123-28 (1990). Butcf Milnerv. Apfel, 148 F3d 812,
815-17 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, CJ.).
44 See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985).
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of the political process. 45 Collective action theory suggests that being "discrete and
insular" may on balance tend to help, rather than hurt, a group's bargaining ability46
Deciding whether a group is the victim of mere prejudice, or instead of principled
rejection, is often contested.47 The theory underlying a given judicial decision on
the proper level of scrutiny for a particular classification may bear only a quite
modest relation to the actual cultural facts. 48
Let us in any event summarize some of the considerations commonly
associated with suspect classifications: historical intentional discrimination or
prejudice, historical political powerlessness, disenfranchisement, disadvantage,
immutability of some classificatory trait, innocence or nonvoluntariness of class
membership, and discreteness and insularity of the class.49 Presumably, current as
opposed to merely historical powerlessness or disadvantage could be relevant as
well. If we add up these considerations, do we arrive at the conclusion that disabled
persons, or at least the most severely disabled persons, fall into suspect classification
status?
The conclusion of the Supreme Court is in the negative. The Court's most
extended and explicit discussion of the issue is in the well-known case of City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.50 Cleburne deals specifically with mentally
retarded persons seeking to live in a group home,51 but the logic of the opinion
would seem to extend to other forms of disability. The opinion of the Court can
hardly deny the history of discrimination against the disabled.52 Instead, the Court
emphasizes the common benevolence of the public and of private parties toward the
disabled,5 3 the diversity of the class of disabled persons,54 as well as the legitimate,
4 5 See id. at 717,733 n.35, 745 n.57.
4 6 See id. at 723-24.
47 See id. at 737-38; see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1982) ('To infer... that the process has been corrupted by invidious
discrimination-a judge must have some substantive vision of what results the process should
have yielded. Otherwise he has no way to know that the process was unfair.").
4 8 See Ackerman, supra note 44, at 745.
4 9 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
50 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
51 See id. at 435. The Court's opinion actually distinguishes explicitly between the mentally
retarded and the disabled, in the course of expressing a reluctance to admit too many groups into
suspect classification status. See id. at 445-46.
5 2 See id. at 455, 461-63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 3 See id. at 443-44.
5 4 See id. at 442. See also Ellis, supra note 43, at 377, 381; SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 5
("There are hundreds of different disabilities. Some are congenital; most come later in life. Some
are progressive,... [o]thers are episodic .... "). As it turns out, "[f]ewer than 15 percent of
disabled Americans were bom with their disabilities." Id at 7.
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non-invidious reasons underlying a number of classifications on the grounds of
disability.55 After all, any government program providing some minimal benefits
to disabled persons but not to others could well be benevolently and non-invidiously
intended.
It is actually not difficult at all to make an argument that some forms of
recognized disability fall generally within the scope of suspect classification status,
if perhaps only along with other similarly unrecognized groups. Historical attitudes
toward persons with disabilities have obviously been mixed. As but a single, far
from extreme example, consider an incident reported second hand by Erving
Goffiman:
I remember... a man at an open-air restaurant in Oslo. He was much disabled, and
he had left his wheel-chair to ascend a rather steep staircase up to the terrace where
the tables were. Because he could not use his legs he had to crawl on his knees, and
as he began to ascend the stairs in this unconventional way, the waiters rushed to
meet him, not to help, but to tell him that they could not serve a man like him at that
restaurant, as people visited it to enjoy themselves and have a good time, not to be
depressed by the sight of cripples.56
We need not, however, make the argument herein that some or all persons with
disabilities should be able to take advantage of suspect classification status. The
Court's criteria for suspect status seem unclear in their applicability to disabled
persons and of doubtful logical and moral relevance, even if they could
straightforwardly guide the Court. There may, in some cases, perhaps even be
something loosely paradoxical about a group's winning official and widespread
recognition as a suspect class. To be popularly granted suspect classification status
by the highest court in the land hardly suggests a broad, consistent, general public
hostility toward the affected group, at least unless we assume that the contemporary
Supreme Court is significantly more advanced in its moral thinking than the public
generally. This does not, however, mean that the courts should apply something like
the standard versions of minimum scrutiny in the case of severely disabled persons,
as we shall see in Part IV below.
Certainly, persons with disabilities form not merely a large,57 but a diverse,
55 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-45.
5 6 ERViNG GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTIY 120
(1963) (quoting F. CARLING, AND YEr WE ARE HUMAN 56 (1962)). More fancifully, see, for
example, HUGO, supra note 1, at 140-42. Intrigugingly, Congress itself refers explicitly in the
ADA to persons with disabilities as a "discrete and insular minority" meeting most, if not all, of
the tests for suspect classification status. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). But see infra note
62.
57 The preamble to the Americans with Disabilities Act refers to 43,000,000 Americans with
disabilities as of the date of enactment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). Presumably, an aging
[Vol. 60:145
DISABILITIES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
heterogeneous group.58 Of course, the more broadly the group of persons with
disabilities is defined, the less the group members will tend to have in common. The
idea of disability can be defined in any number of ways, but some of the major
statutes tend to be rather broad and inclusive in scope.59 Michael A. Rebell observes
that "[w]ithin each disability category is a wide diversity of conditions and needs.
These range, for example, from the severely mentally retarded to the mildly learning
disabled, from wheelchair-bound paraplegics to clubfoot sufferers with mild
mobility impairments. '60 Disability may be measured not against the general
population, but against the higher standards of relatively accomplished groups.61
Generally, the more diverse the group, the less readily it can aptly be
characterized as discrete and insular.62 Often, disability theorists and activists tend
clearly to want, rightly or not, to undercut the logic of discreteness and insularity of
the disabled. Certainly, some forms of disability are intermittent, controllable by
medication, or difficult for employers to detect.63 It is argued that disabling
population may enhance this figure, as may, interestingly, the advance of medical science-
medicine may both cure or prevent disability, and save the lives of persons who would previously
have died, perhaps for disability-related reasons. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 5.
5 8 See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 5.
5 9 See supra note 47.
6 0 Mchael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disablea 74 GEO. LJ.
1435, 1438 (1986).
61 See the especially interesting case of Bartlett v. New York State Bd. ofLaw Exam 'rs, 970
F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Bartlett was found to be disabled under the ADA when her
reading fluency was compared not to the average member of the general population, but to the
average college student or the average law student. See id. at 1120-21. Presumably, such a
standard assumes that if the person with the disability were not impaired, her relevant ability level
would be commensurate with other dimensions of her general measured intelligence, and therefore
above the general average, but not higher than a level commensurate with those other dimensions
of her intelligence. For further discussion, see Robert F. Ladenson, What Is a Disability?, 11 INT'L.
J. APPLIED PHIL. 1, 2-3 (1996).
62 But see the prefatory findings to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). See also
Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1 1th Cir. 1998); W. Robert Gray, The
Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities and John Rawls'
Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295, 314 (1992). Of course, if Congress had been
serious about the suspect classification status of persons with disabilities, it is hardly clear why it
would have allowed a broad cost-benefit defense to claims ofintentional discrimination. See supra
notes 12, 13, 22 and accompanying text. By contrast, intentional discrimination on the grounds
of race can hardly be justified by reference to modest cost-benefit calculations. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications,
imposed by federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny). It is
difficult to explain this marked difference in the constitutional tests applied if race and disability
both evoke strict scrutiny as suspect classifications.
63 Note, for example, the possibility of medically controlled diabetes as a disability under the
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conditions occur randomly, potentially affecting anyone, at any point in the life
cycle,64 and thus we must all contemplate our being personally drawn within the
classification. 65 Thus "disabled people are not 'other,' . . they are really 'us.'
Unless we die suddenly, we are all disabled eventually." 66 In some sense, a sharp,
binary disabled/nondisabled distinction is obviously questionable, 67 and there are
undeniable and important variations in the lives and circumstances of even the most
severely disabled persons.
The public attitudes of currently non-disabled persons also seem largely
incongruent with the logic of discrete and insular status. One poll indicated that
almost half the public, sensing their personal vulnerability, feared becoming
disabled themselves.68 Of course, fear of personal disability hardly implies that one
must feel benevolent toward those who are currently disabled. But the disabled are
a class to which we may all eventually belong. Admittedly, "sixteen percent were
angered because 'disabled people are an inconvenience,' and nine percent said they
felt resentment at 'the special privileges disabled people receive.' 69 But the broader
ADA. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that the evaluation of a disability is to be made "without considering the ameliorative effects of [the
plaintiff's] insulin medication"). But cf Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (rejecting the EEOC interpretation at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. § 1630.26));
Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 811-12 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same). For a discussion
ofmedically controlled epilepsy, see, for example, Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.,
136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that "disabled individuals who control their
disability with medication may still invoke the protections of the ADA). The Supreme Court has
held that "asymptomatie" HIV infection is a disability under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118
S. Ct. 2196,2204 (1998).
64 See Rebell, supra note 60, at 1440 (stating that "because disabling conditions occur
randomly, each individual is personally susceptible of at some time becoming a member of the
handicapped minority on a temporary or permanent basis through disease, accident, or age").
65 See id.
66 Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory ofDisability, HYPATIA, Summer 1989, at 104,
108.
67 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection From Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions ofthe Definition ofDisability,
42 ViLL. L. REV. 409, 519 (1997).
68 See Stein, supra note 6, at 261-62.
69 Id. at 262. Some fraction of these figures may reflect the inconvenience of non-disabled
persons not being able to themselves utilize the mirage-like, highly desirable and tauntingly
available handicapped parking spaces. In whatever spirit, handicapped parking spaces are not
invariably held sacrosanct. See, e.g., Sylvia Moreno, New Parking Fee Irks Disabled Drivers;
Arlington Charges for Handicapped Spaces, Hoping to Curb Abuses by Able-Bodied, WASH.
POST, June 2, 1998, at B1. One might imagine that these response figures understate the true
percentages, given the presumed social undesirability of this sort of whining. But on the other
hand, this argument would itself assume a public norm against expressing this sort of hostility
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public sentiment more typically partakes of something like pity,70 if not more
affirmatively progressive attitudes.71 Surely the most severely disabled persons
generally evoke at least as much pity as those less severely disabled.
The courts and commentators accordingly tend to conclude that the major
difficulties faced by persons with disabilities stem not from public hostility or
prejudice, but at worst from thoughtlessness, indifference, or neglect.72 These are
not the sorts of attitudes that are typically thought to call for the imposition of
suspect class status. Given our universal vulnerability to disability in the future, the
large number of currently disabled persons and disabled voters,73 and the general
lack of hostility toward the disabled, 74 the courts and commentators tend to trust the
ordinary legislative processes to adequately protect the interests of the disabled. The
Supreme Court in Cleburne quoted John Hart Ely to the following effect: "Surely
one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she can't do anything
about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that elected officials are
unusually unlikely to share that feeling. '75 The Court thus rejected the claim "that
the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability
to attract the attention of the lawmakers. '76
The official view is thus that the disabled, or at least those who cannot be
blamed for their disability, evoke widespread sympathy, or at least pity. As
legislators presumably share in this sentiment, suspect classification status is not
appropriate for persons with disabilities. Again, we do not suggest in the slightest
that pity is actually the appropriate general attitude toward disabled persons, merely
that it is not typically considered grounds for invoking suspect classification status.
What we have called limited benevolence thus undermines any stringency with
which measures aimed at the disabled might otherwise be judicially reviewed.
toward the disabled.
70 See Stein, supra note 6, at 252.
71 Cf SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 332 (stating that "people with disabilities want neither pity-
ridden paternalism nor overblown admiration").
72 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985) (characterizing the public
state of mind, as of 1973, as one more of thoughtlessness and indifference than overt animus);
Wendell, supra note 66, at 110 (stating that 'nany of the 'special' resources the disabled need
merely compensate for bad social planning that is based on the illusion that everyone is young,
strong, healthy (and often male)").
73 See supra notes 57, 64-66 and accompanying text. See also Stein, supra note 6, at 258
(stating that "nearly one in seven Americans has some form of disability").
74 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
7 5 City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,442 n.10 (1985) (quoting JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980)).
76 Id. at 445. But see Ladenson, supra note 61, at 7 (acknowledging that persons with
disabilities are ignored and facing "possibly overwhelming obstacles" to political defense of their
interests).
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Generally, disability of whatever degree does not fit the standard logic of strict
judicial scrutiny through suspect classification.
What this shows is, however, subject to reasonable dispute. We might simply
infer that persons with disabilities generally receive their constitutional due, and that
there is nothing constitutionally defective overall with the various federal statutes
and programs addressing the disabled. This, however, is not the only possible
inference. We might instead infer that the familiar logic of suspect classification
status does not responsively address the circumstances of the most severely
disabled. Being able to draw the attention of legislators, or to evoke pity, is hardly
the same as evoking a sense of the fundamental equality of even the most severely
disabled persons. Nor is subjectively respecting the most severely disabled persons
a guarantee that their equal protection rights are being fully respected. The standard
suspect classification inquiry would thus be inadequate with respect to the most
severely disabled. Instead, a different, deeper, and truer logic of equal protection
would be required.
IV. DISABILITIES AND THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The most basic elements of such a deeper logic of equal protection are not
difficult to construct The ideas ofjustice and morality themselves require the equal
and universal consideration of interests.77 This, however, is not just a mechanical
process, as we must be able to empathize broadly, and to place ourselves
insightfuly in the position of others who may be unlike ourselves.78 This basic
requirement applies, certainly, in the case of persons with severe disabilities.79
Disabilities in general are thought of by most persons as relevant in assessing a
person's position for basic moral purposes.
Our basic thesis is simply that genuine equality of constitutional treatment, or
equal protection, requires the law to recognize the significance of severe disabilities.
Merely offering some minimal benefit to some, or even all, such persons not
received by many, or even all, non-disabled persons does not afford equal protection
of the law. If one person is drowning and another person is safely relaxing on dry
land, genuine equal protection requires more than minimal efforts to rescue the
drowning person, even if we do absolutely nothing for the non-drowning person.
We have in such a case admittedly done more, in a sense, for the drowning
person than for the non-drowning person, and in this formal sense given the
drowning person more than equal protection. But in a more serious sense, we have
denied equal protection-literally, much of any protection-to the drowning person.
We have fulfilled only some, and not all, of the drowning person's basic needs for
77 Cf RICHARD M. HARE, MORALTHINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 21 (1981).
78 Cf id. at 22.
79 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 52.
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protection against drowning. And in doing nothing, we have in contrast fulfilled all
of the non-drowning person's needs for protection from drowning. In terms of
fulfillment of this crucial need, the drowning person has received far less than has
the non-drowning person. She has thus been denied equal protection.
One writer has rightly observed that "[e]very person recognizes that she would
be less well off if she suddenly became disabled, even if her bundle of social goods
remained the same. Why would she not want society also to recognize her
disadvantage?"80 Surely the relevant considerations may include not only resources
such as the financial assets we earn or inherit, but our basic physical health and
strength as well.81 If we are to treat like cases alike, and unlike cases unalike, we
must take severe disability and its absence into consideration. We do not accord
equal protection to person A by only minimally accommodating A's blamelessly
incurred basic need, while doing nothing for B who simply has no such
corresponding need. Although we have in some formal sense given more to A than
to B, we have thereby left A's but not B's blameless basic needs unfulfilled.
When we assess someone's overall advantages and disadvantages, we naturally
include consideration of physical and mental disabilities because these conditions
often affect a person's basic capacity to function in ways that persons in general, or
even that particular person, have reason to value.8 2 Disabled persons may thus be
at a crucial special disadvantage, in that even an income equal to that of a non-
disabled person may leave the disabled person worse offby comparison. 83 This is
80 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEPORARY POLMCAL PHILOSOPHY 71 (1990).
8 1 See RONALD DWoRKIN, Foundations ofLiberal Equality, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECrED
TANNER EssAYs INHUMAN VALUES 190,224 (Stephen Darwall ed. 1995). Dworkin observes that
The resources people control are of two kinds: personal and impersonal. Personal resources
are qualities of body and mind that affect people's success in achieving their plans and
projects: physical and mental health, strength, and talent Impersonal resources are parts of
the environment that can be owned and transferred: land, raw materials, houses, television
sets and computers, and various legal rights and interests in these.
Id.
We may recall that Aristotle notes that Milo the wrestler requires a more robust diet than his
more sedentary peers. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETH-cs OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEON ETHICS
TRANSLATED 65 (JA.K Thomson trans. 1953). Unless we want to challenge the legitimacy of
being a wrestler as a baseline, we should recognize that we are not really treating Milo equally if
we allow him little to eat, and expect him to wrestle, even if we allow his sedentary peers even less.
82 See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 4-5 (1995).
83 See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALrrIES 91, 99 (1981) (citing ALBERT WEALE, EQUALrrY
AND SOciAL POLICY 47 (1978)); Sen states that "equal incomes can still leave much inequality in
our ability to do what we would value doing. A disabled person cannot function in the way an
able-bodied person can, even if both have exactly the same income." SEN, supra note 82, at 20;
see also Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for
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not a matter of unequal medical expenses; many persons with substantial disabilities
have only average or below average medical expenses.84 And for the sake of
simplicity, we may ignore the fact that in our society, a government check does not
bring anything near the social and psychological rewards that may flow from an
earned income check of the same amount
The special overall disadvantage to which disabled persons may be subject may
be thought of, however inaccurately, as natural, or more realistically as socially
constructed, or as a combination of both.85 This overall disadvantage may in any
event be thought of as a matter of natural or social injustice 86 or unfairness. 87 While
it is possible to object to the language of injustice or unfairness, especially if we
dubiously assume that disabilities are never socially constructed even in part,88 a
case for substantial, if not complete89 equalization, can be made. Certainly, at the
very least, our public and legal reactions to disability are either just or unjust, and
not simply natural and inevitable.
Even if we believe that the language of injustice or unfairness, at least in a
narrow sense, is not strictly applicable to a purely physiological condition, we must
still consider issues of luck, responsibility, desert, and voluntariness in connection
with disabilities. Persons differ widely in their physiological condition and
Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 187 (1990) (making a similar argument).
84 See, e.g., Sara D. Watson, The Evolution of a Social Movement, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 254,257-58 (1994).
85 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Layers, 43 HASuNGS LI. 769,
770 (1992) (stating that "[l]ike the notion ofthe poor, the concept ofthe disabled is an artifact of
American law and society); CLAIRE H. LIACHOwriz, DIsABILrY AS A SOCIAL CONsTRUcr:
LEGISLATIvE ROOTs 113 (1988) (describing medical models as distracting from social causation
of the real effects of disability); Wendell, supra note 66, at 105 (stating that "disability is largely
socially constructed"). Of course, the social construction of disability does not mean that the
obvious effects of disability and its treatment are less real to persons with disabilities, or that
medical treatment or prevention is inevitably inconsequential. Instead, the social constructedness
of even severe disabilities should further heighten the sense that disability, and our public treatment
thereof, is a matter ofjustice and equality, or their opposite.
86 See, e.g., LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 13 (1993) (maintaining that "it is a natural
injustice that some are born blind whereas others are not, though it may be more appropriate to say
it is a natural unfairness rather than a natural injustice").
87 See id.
88 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policyfor People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 134 (1998) (pointing out
that dyslexia would not be a disability in anon-literate culture); see also sources cited supra note
85.
89 See SEN, supra note 82, at 91 (recognizing that no feasible redressive policy may
completely equalize the functioning capacities of some persons with disabilities); see also RAE,
supra note 83, at 99 (making similar argument).
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circumstances, even from birth, 90 in ways that crucially affect their prospects. 91 If
the law is to treat people unequally, or even ratify what may appear to some to be
natural inequalities, it must do so only on legitimate, morally relevant grounds.
92
This certainly does not mean that all inequalities should be minimized.93 Rather,
what should be constitutionally unacceptable are stark, dramatic, elemental
disadvantages for which the persons adversely affected cannot be held
responsible.94
Some severe disabilities, certainly, cannot at all be ascribed to any choice, fault
or other responsibility of the person directly affected.95 Some disabilities, for
example, are congenital.96 Others, certainly, involve not the slightest negligence,
risk-acceptance, or even any choice at all on the part of those affected. As one
disability theorist observes, "'success' at being healthy, like beauty, is always partly
a matter of luck and therefore beyond our control."9 7 At the very least, some
instances of disability stem from "brute bad luck' not reflecting any choice or risk
voluntarily undertaken.98 In some rare cases, the bad luck of severe disability may
90 See, e.g., Jeff McMahon, Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, 25 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3,3 (1996).
91 See id.
92 See WHLAM A. GALSTON, LiBERALPURPOSES 198 (1991) (stating that "philosophically,
the distinction between nature and society (or, for that matter, between what we have earned and
what befalls us) must be reinterpreted as the distinction between relevant and irrelevant reasons
for treating individuals in certain ways").
93 See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 71 (1991).
94 See id. ("What seems bad is not that people should be unequal in advantages or
disadvantages generally, but that they should be unequal in the advantages or disadvantages for
which they are not responsible. Only then must priority be given to the interests of the worse off.").
Our concern, it might be emphasized, is not with inequalities in general, but only with the
circumstances faced by persons falling below some baseline referred to as a disability.
95 For the linkages among fault, choice, and responsibility, see TEMKIN, supra note 86, at 13
n.21. See also Jonathan Wolff; Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
97, 99-100 (1998).
96 See, eg., Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. PHiL. & POL'Y 262,
276-77 (1992); SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that "[flewer than 15 percent of disabled
Americans were bom with their disabilities").
97 Wendell, supra note 66, at 114. Of course, sometimes good or bad luck follows upon
some risk or gamble we have undertaken in hopes of a payoff. Thus, someone who is disabled as
a result of an accident in some obviously dangerous, voluntarily undertaken recreational or tortious
activity may well not be able to evade responsibility for some, if not all, of the consequences of
a free and knowledgeable choice. For discussion, see Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality ofResources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 293 (1981) (distinguishing between "bnite luck"'
and "option luck"'); Amneson, supra note 83, at 187 (referring to voluntary participation in
dangerous sports).
98 See IDworkin, supra note 97, at 296; GA. Cohen, On the Currency ofEgalitarian Justice,
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be partly compensated for by, for example, the good luck of being bom into an
exceptionally wealthy family, but we should not imagine this to be a typical pattern.
The themes of alleged free choice and responsibility are, however, typically
relied upon to undercut rather than to support proposals for the redistribution of
resources.99 We see redistribution from the improvident grasshopper to the
industrious ant as both objectionable and shortsighted. We hold the grasshopper
responsible for its risky or foolish choices. But where responsibility and choice
played no role in someone's severely adverse circumstances, we should collectively
admit that this change matters. As Gregory Kavka wrote, "the handicapped typically
are, in virtue of their condition, among the most disadvantaged members of
advanced modem societies' 00 with respect to well-being and opportunities for well-
being."101 Nor should we realistically fear that increased benefits to the most
severely disabled persons will set up strong incentives for people to severely disable
themselves, or to voluntarily turn moderate disability into severe disability, even if
we were to utterly ignore voluntariness in compensating for disability.
It is certainly possible to object to this approach, and not only from the self-
interested standpoint of one who is not now disabled. Some persons with disabilities
object as well. It has been urged, for example, that referring to characteristics for
which disabled persons should not be held responsible, or which are beyond their
control, stigmatizes persons with disabilities as inferior.102 Surely the last thing
99 ETHCS 906, 908 (1989) (discussing the egalitarian impulse to counteract both exploitation and
"brate lucid'); see also id. at 916 (arguing for the elimination of involuntary disadvantage, in the
sense of "disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible, since it does not
appropriately reflect choices that he has made or is making or would make"); Kavka, supra note
96, at 280, 282-83. This is of course not to suggest that persons who become disabled through
voluntary risk taking or even intentional behavior should be consigned to private charity. See id.
at 282-83. Federal benefit programs such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 often do not inquire
into the (initial) voluntariness of the claimant's disability. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 104 F.3d
803, 809 (6th Cir. 1997); Cook v. State, 10 F.3d 17,24 (1st Cir. 1993). But cf Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (Cal. 1984) (taking the voluntariness and self-imposition of a
body-builder's physiology into consideration).
9 9 See, e.g., CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POIACY 1950-1980,
at 212-16 (1984).
100The constitutional arguments herein for redistribution of resources in favor of at least
some disabled persons are intended to apply to our own society, which is bound by an equal
protection clause and is assumed to possess enormous technological (specifically, medical
technology) potential, and more broadly, to generate an enormous economic surplus, much of
which is devoted to consumption that is not even seriously argued to be fulfilling of human
potential. See generally R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDs: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL
CuLTURE 195-96 (1997).
101 Kavka, supra note 96, at 270.
102 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights. Tracing the Evolution
ofFederal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
[Vol. 60:145
DISABILITIES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
disabled persons need is a theory, even if well-intended, that presumes their
inferiority.
There is, however, no necessary connection between having characteristics that
are beyond our control and any suggestion of inferiority of disabled persons.
Disabled persons are not inferior, or somehow less persons. All persons have some
characteristics that are beyond their control, and we are not thereby inferior. Merely
being beyond our control does not make a trait a mark of inferiority. In a sense, that
which was and is beyond our control cannot mark our genuine inferiority, or our
superiority for that matter. Of course, we would not think of a condition as disabling
if we did not evaluate it negatively, but it is the crudest moral error to associate
disability with a person's inferiority in any significant sense. Persons with
disabilities deserve the genuinely equal protection of the laws precisely because they
are genuinely equal as persons. Their basic needs and basic circumstances should
be legally recognized and accommodated as sensitively as those of anyone else.
A loosely parallel analysis could be made in the context of the historical
movement for the equal protection of minorities and women. To argue for equal
protection for such groups is clearly not to suggest their inferiority in any relevant
sense. Rather, it is to point out that their genuine equality as persons is not being, but
should be, legally recognized.
It is worth emphasizing that equal protection is a matter of rights, but that rights
of this sort can be voluntarily waived by competent persons. Anyone with a severe
disability who wishes either to reject that label as inappropriate, or who does not for
any reason wish to accept any additional government benefits, should of course be
respected and accommodated. This would be merely another way in which to treat
such persons equally.
Without a doubt, it is wrong to associate disability with passivity, general
powerlessness, or an inability to take initiative or to change the course of one's
life.103 It is also important, however, to avoid the opposite error of suggesting that
the most heroically triumphant disabled persons should be seen as setting the
standard of legal expectations for all disabled persons.' 0 4 It is really no compliment
to disabled or any other persons to hold them to unrealistic standards, or in general
to pretend that they are other than they are. Doing so is itself undignified, deflects
attention from the need for remedial collective action105 and helps rationalize
1399 (1993).
103 Gregory Kavka observed that "[i]n pointing out the pervasiveness of the difficulties
disabled persons face, I do not mean to suggest that the individuals in question are powerless to
overcome or ameliorate these difficulties." Kavka, supra note 96, at 271.
104 See Wendell, supra note 66, at 116 (stating that "[w]hile disabled heroes can be inspiring
and heartening to the disabled, they may give the able-bodied the false impression that anyone can
'overcome' a disability").
105 Cf. Wasserman, supra note 22, at 7, 8.
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indifference or only limited benevolence toward persons with disabilities. Assigning
responsibility where it does not belong is most typically a matter of expressing
public indifference toward or devaluing and denying justice to those affected.106
Imposing responsibility on those individuals who do not properly bear it thus allows
a society to evade its own remedial responsibility10 7 and may even help account for
the remarkably low disability program benefit levels discussed above.10 8
More substantial transfers of resources to the most severely and faultlessly
disabled would thus help redress, however incompletely, the arbitrary burden of
those disabilities. But there is more to be said in favor of such transfers of resources
than this redress of elemental undeserved burdens. Such transfers of resources also
contribute, on balance, to the important social values of dignity and elemental
physical independence, community-building forms of equality, overall social
freedom, relief of elemental suffering and deprivation, and the development of basic
human potential.
Admittedly, any transfer of resources to the severely genetically unlucky from
the genetically lucky that is not consented to by the latter will reduce, to some
degree, the latter's freedom.109 A tax on business incomes to pay for widely used
curb cuts or accessible buses admittedly reduces at least minimally not only the
income, but quite possibly the effective range of choices available to the non-
disabled. This amounts to a reduction in the latter's effective freedom.110 Any
compulsory transfer of resources would have a similar general effect But it can then
hardly be denied that such transfers also have corresponding and often much more
dramatic effects on the freedom of disabled persons. 11' The feasibility of going
shopping or to a public event, for example, is not just a new ability, but a new
socially generated alternative choice. The range of altemative actions and choices
and therefore the social freedom realistically available to the disabled person has
been valuably extended.
106 See LiACHOWrrZ, supra note 85, at 9 (stating that "[a] substantial part of the devaluation,
and therefore the [socially constructed] disablement of handicapped people can be traced to the
American conceptions of individualism and responsibility").
107 in a different context, see R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE
POOR?, at ch. 2 (1996).
10 8 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
10 9 See Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with
Disabilities Act, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CMT. 495,496, 508 (1996); see
also Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969, 1993
(1994) (discussing Richard Epstein on anti-discrimination law and freedom of contract).
110 See, eg., Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative andPositive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312,
320-21 (1967); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOURESSAYS ONLIBERTY 118, 122-23
(1969).
111 See Phillip Cole, Social Liberty and the Physically Disabled, 4 J. APPLIED PHIL. 29, 29
(1987).
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Any reasonably empathetic or impartial judgment will suggest that transfers of
resources may increase the value and range of effective choice open to disabled
persons far more than they contract that of the non-disabled. No one argues that the
limbs and organs of the non-disabled should be coercively removed and parceled
out among the severely disabled. Less intrusive and less freedom-destructive ways
of assuring equal protection are available. This also is not a matter of forcing non-
disabled persons to be more subjectively thoughtful toward disabled persons, or any
coerced change in attitudes. Non-disabled persons should remain free to think what
they like as far as the Constitution is concerned.
Indeed, the Americans with Disabilities Act is itself commonly defended in
terms of freedom 1 2 and expanded choice,1 13 as well as other values including
equality and participation. 114 Although the ADA can indeed be promoted in terms
of individual freedom, the ADA is hardly the last word in freedom, or other values,
for persons with disabilities. More substantial transfers of resources, including more
substantial SSI-like programs, might well contribute further to the freedom and
developmental opportunities of the disabled.115 Nor could it be said that further
transfers in favor of the disabled must undercut the freedom of the non-disabled to
any counterbalancing degree. Instead, the main effect would presumably be to
merely reduce the inequality in effective ranges of valuable choice open to disabled
and non-disabled persons.
The basic point has been aptly expressed by philosopher Philip Kitcher,
who observes that:
Respect for individual liberty is a worthy ideal, but that ideal cannot properly be
expressed in a "hands off' attitude toward redistribution of assets ....
[R]edistribution might decrease the autonomy of the privileged by only a slight
amount while greatly enhancing the autonomy of the helplessly disadvantaged....
I]he directive not to demand assets from the well-to-do would be more accurately
advertised as a maxim to respect the liberty of the winners in the lotteries that fix
initial circumstances.116
1 12 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 6, at 246 (quoting President George Bush referring to the
ADA as heralding "a bright new era of equality, independence, and freedom").
113 See, eg., Blanck, supra note 24, at 883 (stating that "[t]he ADA reflects a policy of equal
opportunity, full participation, and choice in life").
114 See supra notes 112-13.
115 Cf. Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,455,466 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "what once was a 'natural' and 'self-evident'
ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and
freedom").
116 pHILIP KrrCHER, THE LIVEs TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN
PossDB]rnas 313-14 (1996).
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The basic values by which we assess justice and fairness as components of equal
protection thus point toward more substantial transfers of resources in favor
generally of severely disabled persons.
This is not to suggest that our leading theorists have unequivocally endorsed
such resource transfers. Even the work of John Rawls, for example, leaves loose
ends in this regard. Rawls's theory is sufficiently rich, multi-leveled, and detailed
that the interests of disabled persons are affected at a number of points. Thus there
is no simple, easily statable Rawlsian approach to disability. Rawls's basic view is
that the distribution ofpurely natural assets is not itself a matter ofjustice.117 On the
other hand, "undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth
and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
compensated for .... [1]n order to treat all persons equally, society must give more
attention to those with fewer native assets."1 18 Rawls's principles do, at one level,
provide for certain inequalities in the provision of basic social goods,119 and he
typically seems to see inequalities as mainly a matter of economic wealth and
poverty, without giving independent consideration to even severe disabilities.120
Some severely cognitively disabled persons probably do not count as Rawlsian
moral persons for purposes of bargaining over or selecting principles ofjustice.121
But the inequalities Rawls permits must be compatible with basic Rawlsian
principles of equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity.122 An authentically
Rawlsian approach could therefore ask whether severely disabled persons are
accorded equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity at the constitutional level.
Thus if Rawls believes that two persons are equally well off whenever they
have equal incomes, even though one may be severely disabled and may even
117 Clearly, there are many disabilities that may afflict someone from birth that may be
traceable, at least in part, to family poverty. Thus, some inequalities of natural assets may reflect
injustice in the distribution of goods and opportunities.
118 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100-01 (1971).
119 See id. at 76-80; see also Alexander J. Bolla, Jr., Distributive Justice and the Physically
Disabled: Myth and Reality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 983,984 (1983).
120 See SEN, supra note 82, at 92; see also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 126-27
(1978) (endorsing Rawls's focus on the worst-off productive workers, as opposed to severely
disabled persons with or without market-based incomes, but also at least raising the issue of the
fairness of equating the incomes of persons with and without expensive medical needs);
KYMLICKA, supra note 80, at 70-71; Gray, supra note 62, at 312. If we define 'disability' as
broadly as most statutes do, the range of severity of disabilities becomes so correspondingly broad,
from mild to severe, that it is difficult to see the disabled in general as a homogeneous group, let
alone as the worst off representative group for purposes of reflection on principles ofjustice.
121 See RAwLs, supra note 118, at 505; see also Gray, supra note 62, at 333; McMahon,
supra note 90, at 5.
122 See RAwLs, supra note 118, at 302-03.
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require expensive treatment or other services, his view would be unrealistic. 12 3 But
although Rawls does not view the disabled, in general, as the least well off group,124
and does not focus specifically on persons' physical capabilities or limitations, 125
he clearly includes rights, opportunities, and powers to be within the scope of his
important measuring rod of "primary social goods."'1 26 Thus, for Rawls, a disabled
person can be importantly worse off, if, because of our reactions to her disabilities
she has few realistic social or civic opportunities, even if her monetary income is
equal to that of a non-disabled person.
Rawls also develops what he refers to as the Aristotelian Principle, 127 which
can certainly be turned to the advantage of persons with disabilities. The
Aristotelian Principle holds that all else equal, persons enjoy the development and
exercise of their latent capacities, and in complex rather than limited or repetitious
ways. 128 This principle accounts for the relative prominence among adults of
bridge, as opposed to tic-tac-toe, clubs. It also helps explain why many persons with
disabilities object to socially constructed barriers to the fuller exercise of their latent
capacities, even if reducing those barriers would be socially expensive. The transfer
of resources to many severely disabled persons can easily be said to advance the
development of their potential more meaningfully than the loss of such resources
could be said to inhibit such development on the part of non-disabled persons.
Surely, most middle class persons spend significantly on commercial goods and
services that they canrot pretend to argue advance the development of their higher
capacities.
The deepest Rawlsian contribution to the case for more significant resource
transfers in favor of severely disabled persons, though, is more indirect The idea of
a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance"129 as a device to screen out morally arbitrary biases
in choosing principles ofjustice is by now familiar.130 We can, and should, apply
the logic of a veil of ignorance to the context of disability. Behind this veil, we are
asked to choose principles of distributive justice without knowing whether we are
able-bodied or afflicted with some severe congenital disability. To choose a rule of
justice regarding disabled persons on the selfish basis that we ourselves are not
disabled-or in fact are indeed disabled-really tells us very little about justice as
opposed to self-interest based on our own morally arbitrary initial lot in life. Behind
123 See KYMLICKA, supra note 80, at 70-72.
124 See supra note 120; see also Dworkin, supra note 97, at 339.
125 See SEN, supra note 82, at 92.
126 RAVLS, supra note 118, at 62.
127 See id at 424-33; see also Gray, supra note 62, at 334.
128 See RAWLs, supra note 118, at 426; see also Gray, supra note 62, at 334.
129 RAWILS, supra note 118, at 136-42.
130 See id.
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the veil of ignorance, we are logically led in the direction of taking everyone's
interests seriously, and of choosing principles of justice on morally relevant
grounds. Under such circumstances, we are less inclined to slight the severely
disabled, as we might well, for all we know, be thereby slighting ourselves.
It is all very well to argue that disabled persons are not "other," or that we must
appreciate that most of us will eventually become disabled, in some way, if we are
lucky.131 The direct, personal interests of non-disabled adults and of those persons
significantly disabled from birth nonetheless still undeniably conflict. Able-bodied
adults know they face some future likelihood of some form of disability. Even this
realization may be discounted, as merely a distant possibility set in an unreal future.
The able-bodied also know, in the absence of a veil of ignorance, that they were not
born with and did not early develop a disability, and cannot possibly gain directly
from any transfer to such persons. There are no insurance pools for publicly known,
fully established present circumstances.
Ifjustice were thus a matter of the results of self-interested bargaining between
the severely disabled and the non-disabled, the disabled would hardly stand a
chance.132 As long as all participants know their statuses, the disabled have little to
bargain or negotiate. What can the severely disabled offer? What can they threaten?
Where are the resources with which the severely disabled might exert any sort of
leverage to counterbalance that of the able-bodied? Why can't the non-disabled
simply wait them out?133
Under such bargaining conditions, "equal" protection is reduced to the
government's offering only minimal rescue services to the blamelessly drowning,
while not making any special effort at all to rescue the non-drowning. This, again,
offers only formal as opposed to substantive or responsive equal protection. If
justice were a matter of leverage, the severely disabled would be out of luck Justice,
however, is distinct from, if not rather the opposite of, the exertion of arbitrarily
acquired leverage. The exploitation of a monopoly one happened to merely luck
into, genetically or otherwise, is not the expression of a principle of equality in any
serious sense. An understanding of bargaining that allows the undeservedly well off
131 See, for example, Wendell, supra note 66, at 108, which states that "disabled people are
not 'other,' they are really 'us.' Unless we die suddenly, we are all disabled eventually."
132 Thomas Hobbes famously assumes rough equality in the sense that the weakest, at least
in combination, are able to kill the strongest, but it is not clear that his model can be stretched to
encompass all of the severely disabled. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, at ch. 13
(Prometheus Books ed., 1988). For an updated revision, see generally DAVID GAUTHIE, MORALS
BY AGREEMENT (1986). For general background, see generally JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACr TRADION (1986); GREGORY S. KAvKA, HOBBESiAN MORAL AND POLmCAL
THEORY (1986).
133 Contrast the emphasis, in much feminist thought, on interdependence as opposed to
justice construed as a resultant of the pursuit of individual self-interest. See Watson, supra note 84,
at 261-62.
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to ignore or even to starve the undeservedly weak into submission is a question-
begging, if not utterly perverse, understanding ofjustice and equality.
There is not much good faith interest in an idea ofjustice or equal protection
that serves merely to validate the exercise of pre-existing, pre-moral advantages in
the distribution of resources and abilities. We see the expression of self-interested
power and legitimizing charity in current patterns of public spending on disabilities
and general health care. This gulf between power and justice is especially clear
when we focus on matters of age. Again, non-disabled adults hardly need fear
disability retroactively. They thus gain little direct benefit by helping those with
congenital disabilities. Collectively, we can choose between spending heavily on,
say, preventing childhood disabilities, or spending heavily on medical care for those
at the end of a long and medically largely unimpaired life. Current health care
spending patterns reflect the political influence of the morally arbitrary advantage
of age.134
It is not surprising that "[r]esearch, funding, and medical care are more directed
toward life-threatening conditions than toward chronic illnesses and disabilities. '135
At some level, it is hardly objectionable to prioritize death over disability. What is
objectionable, however, is publicly prioritizing the desperate extending of the last
few months of a previously unimpaired life over the research and development
needed to reduce the frequency or severity of the most serious congenital
disabilities. 136 Devoting scarce public resources to the brief prolongation of a full
and generally unimpaired life at the expense of those who might otherwise have
avoided a life of serious disability is unjust,137 however faithfully such a public
priority may reflect self-interested voting strengths. 138
134 This is again not to suggest that persons with severe disabilities also have above average
health care costs; some such disabilities have no medical complications and no associated
expensive medical treatment.
135 Wendell, supra note 66, at 114.
136 See KrrCIHR, supra note 116, at 305 ("The great preponderance of the money spent on
health care in the United States is used to prolong lives for very short periods (under about
eighteen months), and a large proportion of this is spent during the last month of life?). For some
remarkable survey figures on spending priorities, see Marion Danis & Larry R. Churchill,
Autonomy and the Common Weal, 21 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.--Feb. 1991, at 25-26. For general
background, see, for example, M. Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide, and
Vulnerable Populations, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (1998).
137 Cf KITCHER, supra note 116, at 306 ('Medicine should be reoriented toward expanding
the potential of the young.").
13 8 One might argue that some of the end-of-a-full-life medical spending also prevents or at
least delays serious disability, as well as death. Certainly, this effect, in isolation, is a victory on
the broad disability front But it can hardly be considered central by those generally concemed
with the status of disabled persons. For obvious reasons, a disability that accrues only in relatively
old age cannot be given moral weight comparable to that of a congenital disability. Persons who
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V. CONCLUSION
Self-interest leads the political and legal system to what we have referred to as
only limited benevolence 139 toward even the most severely and blamelessly
disabled. This has been rationalized through the American ethos of
individualism, 140 which leaves economic burdens primarily on the affected person,
the immediate family,141 and on private charity, 142 with resulting inequalities then
being only minimally adjusted 143 or thought of as inevitable. 144 Genuine equal
protection, on the other hand, requires that public policy take obvious basic
differences in undeserved circumstances and needs into full consideration. Genuine
equal protection does not throw halfa lifeline to a drowning person, and the same
half lifeline, or no rope at all, to a spectator relaxing in a lounge chair.
This is not to suggest that the burden of public costs is itself irrelevant, or that
any degree of additional benefit to disabled persons is worth any public cost burden.
We certainly need not argue that equal protection requires reducing the overall
resources of all other persons to that of the most severely burdened disabled
persons. An extreme program ofredistribution might undercut work and investment
incentives, and might therefore reduce economic growth along with medical and
other technological advances, such that even the most severely disabled themselves
might then be worse off.145 We should also consider the value of providing
become disabled, even quite blamelessly, in their mature years have typically had the opportunity
to relevantly insure, to form a stable identity, to freely achieve employment goals, and to freely
pursue relationships. They are statistically and culturally more nearly normal. Such persons have
escaped both death and early disability, and are unlucky only by comparison with the luckiest
persons. For a literary example of late and unanticipated disability, see Leo Tolstoy, The Death of
Ivan lych, in GREAT SHORT WORKS OF LEO TOLsTOY 245, 302 (Louise & Aylmer Maude trans.,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1967).
139 See supra notes 69--76 and accompanying text.
14 0 See LiAcHOwrrZ, supra note 85, at 9 ("A substantial part of the devaluation, and therefore
the disablement of handicapped people can be traced to the American conceptions of individualism
and responsibility."); see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. Note also that the
employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act can have only limited redressive
impact as long as the burden of accormnodation remains on individual private employers, rather
than the broader taxpaying public.
141 See Wendell, supra note 66, at 110 (stating that "[d]isability is also frequently regarded
as a personal or family problem rather than a matter for social responsibility").
142 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 6, at 250.
143 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
144 See Gray, supra note 62, at 315 (arguing that historically, the general economic inferiority
or subordination of persons with disabilities has been viewed as an 'inevitable' consequence of the
limits stemming from the disability itself).
14 5 See Kavka, supra note 96, at 290. Note in particular the huge moral difference in
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economic incentives and of allowing for current inequalities that may well indirectly
benefit future disabled persons. Certainly, some persons with some forms of
disability cannot yet be offered the option of a narrowly medical or technological
cure, given the current limits on scientific understanding, whatever other
accommodations might be offered.146 But the options available to severely disabled
persons can be changed. We should hardly imagine that the capacities of medicine,
engineering, and other technologies should be regarded as fixed and unalterable.
Nor should we focus exclusively on the interests of the disabled in setting limits
to redistribution. Beyond some point, which will certainly vary depending upon the
type of disability and the state of medical technology, a further transfer of resources
to a disabled person may do little or nothing to genuinely improve the circumstances
and opportunities of that person 147 and may be enormously 148 or somehow
disproportionately 49 costly to the general taxpaying public. At some point, further
transfers would, for example, undercut the liberties of the non-disabled more than
they would enhance the liberties and opportunities of the recipients. There certainly
need be no brutal reduction of the basic liberties and opportunities of the non-
disabled.150
Admittedly, it is not possible to derive some uniquely correct, precise rule
limiting such transfers from a general understanding of what equal protection for
disabled persons requires. 151 However, this unavoidable imprecision is a general
fact about principles ofjustice and morality.152 It should not be a license to continue
reducing the population of disabled persons by offering at least some the option of non-disability,
and in contrast by failing to save the lives of severely disabled persons through medical or
technological backwardness. Of course, there is a sense in which a medical breakthrough cure for
some, but not all, severe disabilities tends to increase inequality as between those newly curable
and those not newly curable. We shall assume that such partial cures are arrived at and made
available in a morally unobjectionable way, and that their aggregate primary effect is to increase
equality overall.
146 See Wasserman, supra note 22, at 10.
14 7 See id.
148 See FRIED, supra note 120, at 127; see also Dworkin, supra note 97, at 300.
149 See KYMUICKA, supra note 80, at 78 ("Since each additional bit of money might help the
severely disadvantaged person, yet is never enough to equalize circumstances fully, we might be
required to give all our resources to people with such handicaps, leaving nothing for everyone
else.') (citations omitted).
150 See id. at 79-81; see also Dworkin, supra note 97, at 301.
151 See Dworkin, supra note 97, at 299-301.
152 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 15. For a somewhat broader pessimism, see JEAN
HAMPTON, PoLrrCAL PHILOSOPHY 159 (1997) ("Neither I nor anyone else has a convincing and
decisive argument ... about how to pursue equal treatment in democratic societies ..... ).
Presumably this does not mean that all possibilities are equally well-justified, or that the status quo
is well or even minimally justified. A degree of uncertainty, applicable to all approaches, hardly
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to underrecognize the equal protection rights of blameless persons who have been
severely disabled throughout most or all of their lives. All we can or need do is
select, on the best grounds we can, any more precise rule from among the best-
justified general possibilities. Any precise equal protection rule selected from that
set should, on our best arguments, be an improvement over the current
constitutional status quo.
Thus, it is certainly not possible, using only an improved general understanding
of the relevant principles of equal protection, to say not only that a substantially
more generous transfer of resources is appropriate, but that the overall dollar value
of the transfer should, in any given case, be one specific figure rather than another.
Not all severe disabilities are equally severe. Not all, certainly, are equally costly,
if indeed they are costly at all, in medical care. To avoid some of the administrative
costs and possible arbitrariness of individualized case-by-case determinations, some
standardized but reasonably sensitive categories should be developed. These
categories should embody obvious considerations including the timing of the onset
of the disability, medical and therapeutic possibilities and costs, other costs of care
and accommodation, matters of responsibility, social stigma, unrelievable pain,
degrees of freedom and mobility, prognosis, and perhaps the availability of other
sources of income if such sources are unusually large. Some balance between a
purely individualized, essentially subjective focus and a crude distinction only
between severe disability and non-severe disability should be struck, with some
gradation or continuum of benefits being awarded.
The crucial point, certainly, is to not allow the inevitable contingencies and
imprecision of any such scheme to encourage us to rationalize away the merit of the
underlying claims. We do not generally refuse awards to tort victim plaintiffs for
future pain and suffering, loss of consortium, humiliation, or lost future income in
light of the inevitable speculativeness of such awards. 153 We know that whatever
the best figures are, in cases of severe disability, they are not met by current benefit
levels. We could argue otherwise only if we would ourselves be genuinely
indifferent to a choice, from the beginning, between a life of severe disability, along
with current benefits, and a life without such disability.
exempts the status quo.
153 See, e.g., Lesniak v. County of Bergen, 563 A.2d 795, 800-05 (NJ. 1989) (stating that
determinations of infant plaintiff's lost future earnings, as recoverable in tort action against county,
were reasonably probable, though non-quantifiable and therefore utterly imprecise).
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